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Georg Kirchsteiger


Welcome to my website. I am Professor of Microeconomics at the European Center of Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES), Université libre de Bruxelles. I received my PhD from the University of Vienna. Before I moved to Brussels in 2004, I worked at the universities of Vienna, Tilburg, and Maastricht.

My research interests are in the fields of behavioral economics, experimental economics, game theory, and industrial economics. In 2000 I received the Hicks-Tinbergen Award of the European Economic Association (with Ernst Fehr and Arno Riedl).

I teach graduate microeconomics, behavioral economics, and game theory.


ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles                               E-mail:

Office: Av. Roosevelt 42, R42.6.203                                     Phone: + 32 2 650 42 12

Mail: Av. Roosevelt 50, CP 114/04

1050 Brussels



Do Traders Learn to Select Efficient Market Institutions? (with C. Alós-Ferrer and J. Buckenmaier), Experimental Economics, April 2021;

Repeated interaction and its impact on cooperation and surplus allocation - an experimental analysis (with S. di Guida, T. Han, T. Lenaerts, and I. Zisis), Games, Vol. 12, 25, March 2021 (Supplementary Material);

Timing uncertainty in collective risk dilemmas encourages group reciprocation and polarization (with E. Domingos, J. Grujic, J. Burguillo, F. Santos, and T. Lenaerts), iScience, Vol. 23/12, December 2020;

Modelling Kindness (with M. Dufwenberg), Journal of Economic Behavior & OrganizationVol. 167, November 2019, 228-234;

Assignment procedure biases in randomized policy experiments (with G. Aldashev and A. Sebald), Economic Journal, Vol.127, June 2017, 873–895;

Market selection by boundedly-rational traders under constant returns to scale (with C. Alós-Ferrer), Economic Letters, Vol. 153, 2017, 51-53;

Suspiciously timed trade disputes (with P. Conconi, D. DeRemer, L. Trimarchi, and M. Zanardi), Journal of International Economics, Vol. 105, March 2017, 57-75;

Limited farsightedness in network formation (with M. Mantovani, A. Mauleon, and V. Vannettelbosch), Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 128, August 2016, 97-120;

Generosity motivated by acceptance - evolutionary analysis of an anticipation game (with I. Zisis, D. DiGuida, T. Han, and T. Lenaerts), Scientific Reports, Vol. 5, December 2015, article number 18076;

Learning and market clearing: Theory and experiments (with C. Alós-Ferrer), Economic Theory, Vol. 60(2), October 2015, 203-241;

Loss aversion and consumption choice: Theory and experimental evidence (with H. Karle and M. Peitz), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol 7(2), May 2015, 101–120;

Reciprocity and the ultimatum game (with M. Dufwenberg), in: How Werner Güth's ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior (E. van Damme et al.), Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol 108, December 2014, 292-314;

Other-regarding preferences in general equilibrium (with M. Dufwenberg, P. Heidhues, F. Riedel, and J. Sobel), Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 78(2), April 2011, 613-639;

General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions (with C. Alós-Ferrer), Economic Theory, Vol. 44(3), September 2010, 339-360;

Investments into education - Doing as the parents did (with A. Sebald), European Economic Review, Vol. 54(4), May 2010, 501–516;

On the evolution of market institutions: The platform design paradox (with C. Alós-Ferrer and M. Walzl), Economic Journal, Vol. 120(543), March 2010, 215-243;

Your morals might be your moods (with L. Rigotti and A. Rustichini), Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 59(2), February 2006, 155-172;

Endogenizing market institutions: An experimental approach (with M. Niederle and J. Potter), European Economic Review, Vol. 49(7), October 2005, 1827-1853;

Learning to like what you have - Explaining the endowment effect (with S. Huck and J. Oechssler), Economic Journal, Vol. 115, July 2005, 689-702 (Technical Appendix);

Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions: Experimental evidence (with M. Burda, W. Güth, and H. Uhlig), Homo Oeconomicus, Vol 22(2), April 2005, 169-189.

A theory of sequential reciprocity (with M. Dufwenberg), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 47(2), May 2004, 268-298;

Inefficient equilibria in lobbying (with A. Prat), Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 82(3), December 2001, 349-375;

Theoretically robust but empirically invalid? An experimental investigation into tax equivalence (with R. Kerschbamer), Economic Theory, Vol. 16(3), November 2000, 719-734

Reciprocity and wage undercutting (with  M. Dufwenberg), European Economic Review, Vol. 44(4-6), May 2000, 1069-1078;

Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games (with W. Güth and K. Ritzberger), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 23(1), April 1998, 54-74;

Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets (with E. Fehr and A. Riedl), European Economic Review, Vol. 42(1), January 1998, 1-34;

On the possibility of efficient private provision of public goods through government subsidies (with C. Puppe), Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 66(3), December 1997, 489-504;

Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: Experimental evidence (with E. Fehr and S. Gächter), Econometrica, Vol. 65(4), July 1997, 833-860;

On the formation of political coalitions (with C. Puppe), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 153(2), June 1997, 293-319

Reciprocal fairness and noncompensating wage differentials (with E. Fehr and S. Gächter), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 152(4), December 1996, 608-640

Intransitive choices based on transitive preferences: The case of menu-dependent information (with C. Puppe), Theory and Decision, Vol.41(1), June 1996, 37-58;

Involuntary unemployment and non-compensating wage differentials in an experimental labour market (with E. Fehr and A. Riedl), Economic Journal, Vol. 106, January 1996, 106-121;

The role of envy in ultimatum games, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 25(3), December 1994, 373-389;

Insider power, wage discrimination, and fairness (with E. Fehr), Economic Journal, Vol. 104, May 1994, 571-583; Reprinted in: Behavioral Macroeconomics, Ian McDonald (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012;

Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation (with E. Fehr and A. Riedl), Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108(2), May 1993, 437-459;

Working Papers

Cheap talk is not cheap: Free versus costly communication (with H. Aghadadashli and P. Legros), CEPR Discusssion Paper DP 15843, February 2021

Good rankings are bad: Why reliable rankings can hurt consumers (with L. Bouton), NBER Working Paper 21083, April 2015.


Game Theory with Applications to Economics (ECON-S-412)

      Course description

Graduate Microeconomics I (ECON-S-510)

      Course description

Behavioral Economics (ECON-S-513)

      Course description plus reading list

Graduate Microeconomics III (ECON-S-519)

      Course description plus reading list