**Course Description**

This course introduces into the analysis of strategic economic situations. Using examples from auction theory, bargaining theory, industrial organization, and labor markets the students learn the main concepts used to analyze strategic problems. In particular, the course covers the analysis of static and dynamic games with complete and with incomplete information.

The course consists of three parts:

1. Lectures: There are twelve lectures two hours each. The slides used during these lectures can be downloaded from UV. The slides are not a manuscript. They cannot be understood without attending the lecture and taking lecture notes.

   The videos of the lectures can be streamed in MStreams (https://web.microsoftstream.com)

2. Problem sets/homeworks: Connected to the lectures are problem sets. The files containing these problem sets also provide the answers to the problems. The problem sets plus answers can be downloaded from UV. **Students must study these problem sets plus answers by themselves at home.**

3. Questions and answers sessions: There will be six Q&A sessions. These Q&A sessions do not replace the study of the lectures notes and the connected problem sets plus answers at home. Rather, the Q&A sessions will be used to answer **specific questions that might arise when studying the lectures notes and the connected problem sets plus answers.**

   **The questions for the Q+A sessions have to be handed Sunday before the respective Q+A session, using e-mail (georg.kirchsteiger@ulb.be).**

**Reading list**

Gibbons, R. (1992), A Primer in Game Theory, Prentice Hall.