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Current Position

2004 – today Professor of Microeconomics at the European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES), Université libre de Bruxelles

Other Affiliations

2014 – today Affiliate Faculty of the Vienna Center for Experimental Economics
2005 – today Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
2004 – today Research Fellow of the CESifo Research Network

Past Positions

2002 – 2004 Professor of Public Economics at the University of Maastricht
1997 – 2002 Associate Professor at the University of Vienna
1997 – 1999 TMR Fellow at the CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University
1993 – 1997 Assistant Professor at the University of Vienna

Education

1997 Habilitation in Economics, University of Vienna
1993 PhD in Economics, University of Vienna
1990 Master in Economics, University of Vienna

Fields of Research

Behavioral Economics
Experimental Economics
Game Theory
Industrial Economics

Publications

- Alós-Ferrer C., Kirchsteiger, G., & Buckenmaier, J. (2021). Do Traders Learn to Select Efficient Market Institutions? *Experimental Economics*. doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09710-1
- Di Guida, S., Han, T., Kirchsteiger, G., Lenaerts, T., & Zisis, I. (2021). Repeated interaction and its impact on cooperation and surplus allocation - an experimental analysis. *Games*, 12(1), 25. doi.org/10.3390/g12010025
- Domingos, E., Grujić, J., Burguillo, J., Kirchsteiger, G., Santos, F., & Lenaerts, T. (2020). Timing uncertainty in collective risk dilemmas encourages group reciprocation and polarization. *iScience*, 23(12). doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2020.101752
- Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2019). Modelling Kindness. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 167, 228-234. doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.07.014
- Aldashev, G., Kirchsteiger, G., & Sebald, A., (2017). Assignment procedure biases in randomized policy experiments. *Economic Journal*, 127, 873–895. doi.org/10.1111/econj.12321
- Alós-Ferrer, C., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2017). Market selection by boundedly-rational traders under constant returns to scale. *Economic Letters*, 153, 51-53. doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.008
- Conconi, P., DeRemer, D., Kirchsteiger, G., Trimarchi, L., & Zanardi, M. (2017). Suspiciously timed trade disputes. *Journal of International Economics*, 105, 57-75. doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001
- Kirchsteiger, G., Mantovani, M., Mauleon, A., & Vannetelbosch, V. (2016). Limited farsightedness in network formation. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 128, 97-120. doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.05.016
- Zisis, I., Di Guida, S., Han, T., Kirchsteiger, G., & Lenaerts, T. (2015). Generosity motivated by acceptance - evolutionary analysis of an anticipation game. *Scientific Reports*, 5, 18076. doi.org/10.1038/srep18076
- Alós-Ferrer, C., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2015). Learning and market clearing: Theory and experiments. *Economic Theory*, 60(2), 203-241. doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0885-8
- Karle, H., Kirchsteiger, G., & Peitz, M. (2015). Loss aversion and consumption choice: Theory and experimental evidence. *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, 7(2), 101–120. doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130104
- Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2014). Reciprocity and the ultimatum game. In: How Werner Güth's ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior (E. van Damme et al.). *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 108, 292-314. doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.10.014
- Dufwenberg, M., Heidhues, P., Kirchsteiger, G., Riedel, F., & Sobel, J. (2011). Other-regarding preferences in general equilibrium. *Review of Economic Studies*, 78(2), 613-639. doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdq026
- Alós-Ferrer, C., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2010). General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions. *Economic Theory*, 44(3), 339-360. doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0466-9
- Kirchsteiger, G., & Sebald, A. (2010). Investments into education - Doing as the parents did. *European Economic Review*, 54(4), 501–516. doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.004
- Alós-Ferrer, C., Kirchsteiger, G., & Walzl, M. (2010). On the evolution of market institutions: The platform design paradox. *Economic Journal*, 120(543), 215-243. doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02297.x
- Kirchsteiger, G., Rigotti, L. & Rustichini, A. (2006). Your morals might be your moods. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 59(2), 155-172. doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.07.004
- Kirchsteiger, G., Niederle, M., & Potters, J. (2005). Endogenizing market institutions: An experimental approach. *European Economic Review*, 49(7), 1827-1853; doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.05.006
- Huck, S., Kirchsteiger, G., & Oechssler, J. (2005). Learning to like what you have - Explaining the endowment effect. *Economic Journal*, 115, 689-702. doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01015.x
- Burda, M., Güth, W., Kirchsteiger, G., & Uhlig, H. (2005). Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions: Experimental evidence. *Homo Oeconomicus*, 22(2), 169-189

- Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004). A theory of sequential reciprocity. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 47(6), 268-298. doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.003
- Kirchsteiger, G., & Prat, A. (2001). Inefficient equilibria in lobbying. *Journal of Public Economics*, 82(3), 349-375. doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00134-1
- Kerschbamer, R., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2000). Theoretically robust but empirically invalid? An experimental investigation into tax equivalence. *Economic Theory*, 16(3), 719-734.
- Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2000). Reciprocity and wage undercutting. *European Economic Review*, 44(4-6), 1069-1078. doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(99)00047-1
- Güth, W., Kirchsteiger, G., & Ritzberger, K. (1998). Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 23(1), 54-74. doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0602
- Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. (1998). Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets. *European Economic Review*, 42(1), 1-34. doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(96)00051-7
- Puppe, C., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997). On the possibility of efficient private provision of public goods through government subsidies. *Journal of Public Economics*, 66(3), 489-504. doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00029-7
- Fehr, E., Gächter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997). Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: Experimental evidence. *Econometrica*, 65(4), 833-860. doi.org/10.2307/2171941
- Puppe, C., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997). On the formation of political coalitions. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 153(2), 293-319
- Fehr, E., Gächter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1996). Reciprocal fairness and noncompensating wage differentials. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 152(4), 608-640
- Puppe, C., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1996). Intransitive choices based on transitive preferences: The case of menu-dependent information. *Theory and Decision*, 41(1), 37-58. doi.org/10.1007/BF00134115
- Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. (1996). Involuntary unemployment and non-compensating wage differentials in an experimental labour market. *Economic Journal*, 106, 106-121. doi.org/10.2307/2234934
- Kirchsteiger, G. (1994). The role of envy in ultimatum games. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 25(3), 373-389. doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(94)90106-6
- Fehr, E., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1994). Insider power, wage discrimination and fairness. *Economic Journal*, 104, 571-583. Reprinted in: Behavioral Macroeconomics, Ian McDonald (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012. doi.org/10.2307/2234632
- Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. (1993). Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108(2), 437-459. doi.org/10.2307/2118338

Working Papers

- Kirchsteiger, G., Lenaerts, T., & Suchon, R. (2022). Does voluntary information disclosure lead to less cooperation than mandatory disclosure? Evidence from a sequential prisoner's dilemma experiment. CEPR Discussion Paper DP 17481
- Aghadadashli, H., Kirchsteiger, G., & Legros, P. (2021). Cheap talk is not cheap: Free versus costly communication. CEPR Discussion Paper DP 15843
- Bouton, L., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2015). Good rankings are bad: Why reliable rankings can hurt consumers. NBER Working Paper 21083

Teaching

Behavioral Economics, Game Theory, Graduate Microeconomics

Other Professional Activities

Regional consultant (2008-2013) and Chairperson (2009-2013) of the European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society

Member of the European Standing Committee of the Econometric Society (2009-2013)

Co-Editor of the *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* (2007-2011)

Associate Editor of the *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* (2005-2007)

Editorial Board Member of *Games* (2009-2012)

Award

Hicks-Tinbergen Award 2000 (with E. Fehr & A. Riedl), awarded by the European Economic Association