Contact Publications Working Papers Teaching Curriculum Vitae (pdf)
Welcome to my website. I am Professor of Microeconomics at the European Center of Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES), Université libre de Bruxelles. I received my PhD from the University of Vienna. Before I moved to Brussels in 2004, I worked at the universities of Vienna, Tilburg, and Maastricht.
My research interests are in the fields of behavioral economics, experimental economics, game theory, and industrial economics. In 2000 I received the Hicks-Tinbergen Medal of the European Economic Association (with Ernst Fehr and Arno Riedl).
I teach graduate microeconomics, behavioral economics, and game theory.
ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles E-mail: email@example.com
Office: Av. Roosevelt 42, R42.6.203 Phone: + 32 2 650 42 12
Mail: Av. Roosevelt 50, CP 114/04
Assignment procedure biases in randomized policy experiments (with G. Aldashev and A. Sebald), Economic Journal, Vol.127, June 2017, 873–895.
Market selection by boundedly-rational traders under constant returns to scale (with C. Alos-Ferrer), Economic Letters, Vol. 153, 2017, 51-53.
Suspiciously timed trade disputes (with P. Conconi, D. DeRemer, L. Trimarchi, and M. Zanardi), Journal of International Economics, Vol. 105, March 2017, 57-75.
Limited farsightedness in network formation (with M. Mantovani, A. Mauleon, and V. Vannettelbosch), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 128, August 2016, 97-120.
Generosity motivated by acceptance - evolutionary analysis of an anticipation game (with I. Zisis, D. DiGuida, T. Han, and T. Lenaerts), Scientific Reports, Vol. 5, December 2015, article number 18076.
Learning and market clearing: Theory and experiments
(withC. Alos-Ferrer), Economic Theory, Vol. 60(2), October 2015, 203-241.
Loss aversion and consumption choice: Theory and experimental evidence (with H. Karle and M. Peitz), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol 7(2), May 2015, 101–120.
Reciprocity and the ultimatum game (with M. Dufwenberg), in: How Werner Güth's ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior (E. van Damme et al.), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol 108, December 2014, 292-314.
Other-regarding preferences in general equilibrium (with M. Dufwenberg, P. Heidhues, F. Riedel, and J. Sobel), Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 78(2), April 2011, 613-639.
General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions (with C. Alos-Ferrer), Economic Theory, Vol. 44(3), September 2010, 339-360.
Investments into education - Doing as the parents did (with A. Sebald), European Economic Review, Vol. 54(4), May 2010, 501–516.
On the evolution of market institutions: The platform design paradox (with C. Alos-Ferrer and M. Walzl), Economic Journal, Vol. 120(543), March 2010, 215-243.
Your morals might be your moods (with L. Rigotti and A. Rustichini), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 59(2), February 2006, 155-172.
Endogenizing market institutions: An experimental approach (with M. Niederle and J. Potter), European Economic Review, Vol. 49(7), October 2005, 1827-1853.
Learning to like what you have - Explaining the endowment effect (with S. Huck and J. Oechssler), Economic Journal, Vol. 115, July 2005, 689-702 (Technical Appendix).
Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions: Experimental evidence (with M. Burda, W. Gueth, and H. Uhlig), Homo Oeconomicus, Vol 22(2), April 2005, 169-189.
A theory of sequential reciprocity (with M. Dufwenberg), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 47(2), May 2004, 268-298.
Inefficient equilibria in lobbying (with A. Prat), Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 82(3), December 2001, 349-375.
Theoretically robust but empirically invalid? An experimental investigation into tax equivalence (with R. Kerschbamer), Economic Theory, Vol. 16(3), November 2000, 719-734.
Reciprocity and wage undercutting (with M. Dufwenberg), European Economic Review, Vol. 44(4-6), May 2000, 1069-1078.
Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games (with W. Gueth and K. Ritzberger), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 23(1), April 1998, 54-74.
Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets (with E. Fehr and A. Riedl), European Economic Review, Vol. 42(1), January 1998, 1-34.
On the possibility of efficient private provision of public goods through government subsidies (with C. Puppe), Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 66(3), December 1997, 489-504.
Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: Experimental evidence (with E. Fehr and S. Gaechter), Econometrica, Vol. 65(4), July 1997, 833-860.
On the formation of political coalitions (with C. Puppe), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 153(2), June 1997, 293-319.
Reciprocal fairness and noncompensating wage differentials (with E. Fehr and S. Gaechter), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 152(4), December 1996, 608-640.
Intransitive choices based on transitive preferences: The case of menu-dependent information (with C. Puppe), Theory and Decision, Vol.41(1), June 1996, 37-58.
Involuntary unemployment and non-compensating wage differentials in an experimental labour market (with E. Fehr and A. Riedl), Economic Journal, Vol. 106, January 1996, 106-121.
The role of envy in ultimatum games, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 25(3), December 1994, 373-389.
Insider power, wage discrimination, and fairness (with E. Fehr), Economic Journal, Vol. 104, May 1994, 571-583; Reprinted in: Behavioral Macroeconomics, Ian McDonald (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012.
Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation (with E. Fehr and A. Riedl), Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108(2), May 1993, 437-459.
Good rankings are bad: Why reliable rankings can hurt consumers (with L. Bouton), NBER Workin Paper 21083, April 2015.
TeachingGame Theory with Applications to Economics (ECON-S-412):